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VOLUME 57 MAY 2009 NUMBER 3
James B. Atleson and the
World of Labor Law Scholarship
DIANNE AVERYt AND ALFRED S. KONEFSKYtt
On September 19, 2008, the University at Buffalo Law
School in conjunction with the Baldy Center for Law and
Social Policy presented a symposium to mark the twenty-
fifth anniversary of the publication of James B. Atleson's
Values and Assumptions in American Labor Law.' The
twenty-fifth anniversary retrospective brought together a
variety of scholars and practitioners in the field to discuss
the book and its impact. The symposium sessions were
divided into four panels, entitled Praxis, Ideology, History,
and Transnational Norms, and the participants included
current and former members of the National Labor
Relations Board, labor lawyers, legal historians, labor
historians, and labor law professors from the United States
and Canada. Some of the papers and comments for the
symposium are presented here in the pages of the Buffalo
Law Review. But before the articles begin, we would like to
provide a brief overview of the book, its origins, and impact.
t Professor of Law, University at Buffalo Law School, State University of New
York.
- University at Buffalo Distinguished Professor, University at Buffalo Law
School, State University of New York. We are grateful for the excellent research
assistance provided by David Shaffer, UB Law School class of 2007. We are also
appreciative of the support in planning and administering the Symposium
provided by Lynn Mather, former Director of the Baldy Center for Law and
Social Policy, and her staff, particularly Ellen Kausner and Anne Gaulin.
1. JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAw
(1983). Jim has taught at the University at Buffalo Law School since 1964 and
is currently a SUNY Distinguished Teaching Professor, Emeritus.
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For a number of years the Law School's Alumni
Association has been conducting a series of faculty oral
history interviews, and in October 2007 it reached Jim in
the queue. In the interview, Jim explains the genesis of his
book:
Atleson: It slowly became clear to me that labor was seen as a
discrete area in the law, and whether employees were government
employees or private sector employees, their rights were treated
differently, whether we were talking about constitutional law,
statutory law, or common law .... [I]f the legal question involved
an employment relationship, a separate set of rules often applied.
Plus, it was very hard to understand the Supreme Court
cases or the other court cases I had to deal with in Labor Law.
They just didn't make sense. They were not consistent with the
language of the [National Labor Relations] Act, the policies and
goals of the Act, and the legislative history .... [T]here was some
other game going on. Now, I . . . wasn't sure what it was, and I
mentioned in the book[2] that there was this moment in class
where a student said, "Well, you keep talking about the policies of
the act. You can see what the language of the act is, but how then
can you explain the outcome of this case?" Reed Cosper was his
name. It was in the '60s-a long time ago, and I started to say,
"Well.. . " I started giving him ... the standard argument that...
rights-statutory rights, constitutional rights-aren't necessarily
restricted and [they're] balanced by other policies and so on. I
started giving him the standard response about how you explain
these cases and then suddenly I said, "You know, this doesn't
make any sense." I don't know if I actually said that in class, but I
said it to myself at least.
• . . [S]omehow I realized that the important part of each case
was not the holding or the court's view of the facts, but usually a
sentence that began, "Of course, blah, blah, blah."[3 And, I kept
looking for those sentences because once you got the "of course,"
you knew where the court was going and that was a sign to me
that there was a set of values that courts applied, although some
tendencies could still be explained by class bias. I tried to discover
2. Id. at 1.
3. Id. at 10. Jim Pope wrote, 'To paraphrase a veteran labor scholar, if you
want to know where the corpses are buried in labor law, look for the 'of course'
statements in court opinions." James Gray Pope, How American Workers Lost
Their Right to Strike, and Other Tales, 103 MICH. L. REV. 518, 518 n.1 (2004)
(citing ATLESON, supra note 1, at 24).
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the pictures [the judges] had about work.
And, so I finally worked out four or five values that I thought
helped explain the cases.[41 I mean, there [is] .. . political give-and-
take in cases at the Supreme Court, so you can never intellectually
come up with a scheme . . . to explain all of the cases. It simply
doesn't work that way. But, I was looking for a way to make sense
of the cases and then be able to say to lawyers and my students
that if you want to be a lawyer, you have to understand what these
values are. You can't simply talk about the formal rules of law.
You may lose because you are not talking about what the
underlying questions or values are.
5
Four aspects of Jim's approach to the book emerge from
this portion of the oral history interview.6 First, Jim credits
the origins of the book to what went on in the classroom,
demonstrating his sense of fidelity to his students to help
them make sense of their intellectual experience. He
approached the problems that puzzled him first and
foremost as a teacher, and it is that exercise of explaining
matters to his students that informed his scholarship.
Second, he believes that learning or grasping "the
underlying questions," as he put it, whether they can be
found in sociology, anthropology, economics, history, or
political science, or wherever-the "values and
assumptions"-is a special skill set, just as important a
skill as legal analysis or reasoning, or mastering doctrine,
or drafting, planning, or negotiating-that in reality, truly
effective advocacy in whatever form is absolutely dependent
on framing and understanding those attitudes first. Third,
Jim is possessed of a kind of intense skepticism. He does
not accept the conventional wisdom or the accepted canon
in the field, or anywhere for that matter. Even in the most
casual conversation, Jim always wants to know "why," and
he conveys this to his students as well. Think on your own;
you might be surprised at what you learn. And, finally,
there is that unmistakable passion for social justice. There
4. See ATLESON, supra note 1, at 7-9.
5. Interview by Alfred S. Konefsky with James B. Atleson, SUNY
Distinguished Teaching Professor, Emeritus, University at Buffalo Law School,
State University of New York, in Amherst, N.Y. (Oct. 22, 2007), at 32-35
[hereinafter Atleson Interview] (transcript on file with authors).
6. We will leave more substantive responses to the book to the contributors
of the articles in this symposium.
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are winners and losers, people take advantage of one
another, and we have a democratic promise, including
equality, about which Jim gets really annoyed when he
senses that it is being violated. Jim wants to know how
people can continue to get away with these violations and
what we can do to correct these injustices.
Values and Assumptions was a clarion call for the
rejection of traditional labor law scholarship, which Jim
described as "overwhelmingly doctrinal, or rule oriented
and analytical" and developed "within the context of a
received wisdom.' ' 7 Jim asserted that many labor law
decisions, however, seemed incoherent,8 "odd, irrational, or
at least inconsistent with the received wisdom."9 And so he
set out to provide a method of interpretation for labor law
cases, which he described in the book:
The basic theme of the book, then, is that assumptions and
values about the economic system and the prerogatives of capital,
and corollary assumptions about the rights and obligations of
employees, underlie many labor law decisions. Moreover, these
assumptions permeate modern decision making just as they did
prior to the passage of the Wagner Act. The presence of such
values and assumptions, often only implicit or hinted at, helps
explain many decisions .... 10
In other words, the older common law attitudes about
the employment relationship had survived to be applied
anew in the brave new statutory world of New Deal and
post-New Deal labor law. Old ideas die hard. But if one
looked carefully enough, one could find those old values and
assumptions alive and well, if not always explicitly stated.
Jim identified five core values that were transported from
the old regime to the new:
(1) Continuity of production must be maintained, limited only
when statutory language clearly protects employee interference.
(2) Employees, unless controlled, will act irresponsibly.
(3) Employees possess only limited status in the workplace and,
7. ATLESON, supra note 1, at 1.
8. See James Atleson, Confronting Judicial Values: Rewriting the Law of
Work in a Common Law System, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 435, 439 (1997).
9. ATLESON, supra note 1, at 10.
10. Id.
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correspondingly, they owe a substantial measure of respect and
deference to their employers.
(4) The enterprise is under management's control, and great
stress is placed upon the employer's property rights in directing
the workplace.
(5) Despite the participatory goals of the NLRA [National Labor
Relations Act], employees cannot be full partners in the enterprise
because such an arrangement would interfere with inherent and
exclusive managerial rights. 1 1
By dissecting some of the foundational cases of modern
labor law-like Mackay,12 Fansteel,13 Darlington Mills,14
Jefferson Standard,15 and so on--Jim demonstrated how
the courts applied these core values with a vengeance. Jim
was not exactly suggesting that a bait-and-switch had
occurred, but that, at the very least, a certain degree of
unexamined complacency or satisfaction with the status
quo was concealed behind a mask. This was not a pluralist,
liberal, libertarian, or a progressive labor law, but perhaps
a more radical account of the "received wisdom."' 6 It
highlighted a clash of cultural values, and it seemed to be
rooted in differing perceptions of the impact or legitimacy of
social class or class structure.
The first wave of reactions to Values and Assumptions
11. Atleson, supra note 8, at 439-40 (summarizing the five core "values and
assumptions" described in the book, ATLESON, supra note 1, at 7-9).
12. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
13. NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939).
14. Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263
(1965).
15. NLRB v. Local 1229, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers (Jefferson Standard),
346 U.S. 464 (1953).
16. For descriptions of the historical unfolding of various approaches to
labor law scholarship, see Andrew Wender Cohen, Business Myths, Lawyerly
Strategies, and Social Context: Ernst on Labor Law History, 23 LAw & Soc.
INQUIRY 165, 169-70 (1998) (reviewing DANIEL R. ERNST, LAWYERS AGAINST
LABOR: FROM INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS TO CORPORATE LIBERALISM (1995)), and Daniel
R. Ernst, Picking Up the Pieces, 23 REVS. AM. HIST. 502, 503 (1995) (reviewing
MELVYN DUBOFSKY, THE STATE AND LABOR IN MODERN AMERICA (1994))
(describing "the legal revisionists"). See also Daniel R. Ernst, Taking Stock: New
Views of American Labor Law Between the World Wars, 23 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
481, 482 (2000) [hereinafter Ernst, Taking Stock] ("By 1980, . . . a major
interpretive change was underway, as radical legal scholars and historians
commenced an attack on the New Deal collective bargaining regime from the
left.").
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appeared in book reviews published between 1983 and
1986. There were fourteen all told, and some were in major
law reviews like Stanford, 17 Texas,18 Columbia, 19 and
Michigan. 20 The reviews were mostly favorable. Some called
it "rich, original, [and] provocative," 21 "a significant
milestone in the evolution of our thinking about law and
the work relation, '22 "thought-provoking,"23 or a "thoughtful
historical critical analysis [which] is undeniably fine labor
law scholarship. '24 Others were less generous, finding that
the book's arguments were "seriously undermined by
[Atleson's] attempts to read his own views into the NLRA,
legal precedents, and historical developments '25 or that it
was "polemical. '26
All the reviews seemed to recognize that the book was a
challenge to traditional readings of the contemporary labor
law canon. Some found it invigorating; some found it
threatening. Virtually everyone thought the work was
identified with a new type of scholarly approach described
more or less as "critical labor law jurisprudence. '27 The
scholarship operated
[b]y exposing the underlying belief system of the legal decisions in
labor law,... demonstrat[ing] that the commonly accepted rules of
17. Staughton Lynd, Ideology and Labor Law, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1273 (1984)
(book review).
18. David L. Gregory, Labor Law and the Myth of a Value-Free Legal
Doctrine, 62 TEX. L. REV. 389 (1983) (book review).
19. David M. Rabban, Radical Assumptions About American Labor Law, 84
COLUM. L. REV. 1118 (1984) (book review).
20. Book Note, Atleson: Values and Assumptions in American Labor Law, 82
MICH. L. REV. 843 (1984).
21. Lynd, supra note 17, at 1273.
22. Howard Lesnick, The Consciousness of Work and the Values of American
Labor Law, 32 BUFF. L. REV. 833, 857 (1983) (book review).
23. Douglas E. Ray, Values and Assumptions in American Labor Law, 6
INDuS. REL. L.J. 381, 385 (1984) (book review).
24. Gregory, supra note 18, at 402.
25. Rabban, supra note 19, at 1120.
26. Nick Salvatore, Values and Assumptions in American Labor Law, 4 LAw
& HIST. REV. 484, 484 (1986) (book review).
27. Gary Minda, Decoding Labor Law, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 474, 485
(1984) (book review).
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labor law are responsible for creating a legal consciousness that
denies and betrays values and assumptions which are at the heart
of the American labor movement and which were responsible for
the enactment of the Wagner Act .... 28
Atleson had engaged in "decoding the cluster of beliefs
embedded within doctrine. ' 29 The "full-blown Atleson
thesis" is that "Supreme Court and NLRB decisions
interpreting the NLRA cannot be understood except by
supposing that the decisionmakers used the same common
law notions about management, property, and the like, that
the NLRA is generally thought to have superseded. '30
Whatever it was, it displayed the heart of the Critical Legal
Studies methodology, whatever that was.3 1 The book had
arrived at the height of the Critical Legal Studies
movement and controversies, 32 and became an unwitting
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Lynd, supra note 17, at 1276.
31. For the book reviewers who identified Atleson's book with the Critical
Legal Studies (CLS) movement, see Paul N. Cox, On Debunking Labor Law
Doctrine: A Review of James Atleson's Values and Assumptions in American
Labor Law, 1985 UTAH L. REV. 101, 102 (book review); Gregory, supra note 18,
at 389, 399; Rabban, supra note 19, at 1120; and Book Note, supra note 20, at
845. In introducing a bibliography of CLS scholarship, two founders of the CLS
movement wrote:
We have made no attempt to define what CLS is. The CLS movement
has been generally concerned with the relationship of legal scholarship
and practice to the struggle to create a more humane, egalitarian, and
democratic society. CLS scholarship has been influenced by a variety of
currents in contemporary radical social theory, but does not reflect any
agreed upon set of political tenets or methodological approaches.
Duncan Kennedy & Karl E. Klare, A Bibliography of Critical Legal Studies, 94
YALE L.J. 461, 461 (1984). Several of Atleson's scholarly publications through
1983, including Values and Assumptions, are included in this bibliography of
CLS works. See id. at 465.
32. See generally ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIEs
MOVEMENT (1986). As Tomlins and King have noted:
The Critical Legal Studies movement began in the mid-1970s among a
group of young law school scholars who had become disenchanted with
mainstream legal thought. Using techniques borrowed from neo-
Marxist thought and from contemporary developments in literary and
social theory, these scholars have developed a methodology of
critiquing contemporary jurisprudence.
Christopher L. Tomlins & Andrew J. King, Introduction to LABOR LAW IN
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warrior in the legal culture wars. 33
In the years following the publication of Values and
Assumptions, a broader audience of labor scholars began to
take note of the book. In 1990, for example, one wrote,
"Atleson's work remains the best single exploration of the
importance of dominant social values in the interpretation
and evolution of U.S. labor law."34 In some quarters,
however, citation counts are a measure of a scholar's impact
on a field, and by this metric, Jim's book has had a
significant and sustained impact on labor law scholarship.
In 2007, a search in several electronic databases for
citations to his book indicated that he had been cited in
over two hundred law review articles, book reviews, review
essays, and student notes and comments. 35 A similar search
in 2008 of the Westlaw database of legal journals produced
AMERICA: HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL ESSAYS 17 n.12 (Christopher L. Tomlins &
Andrew J. King eds., 1992).
33. The publication of Atleson's book also coincided with the first stirrings of
a modern scholarship on the history of labor law. See Tomlins & King, supra
note 32, at 3 ("Monographic literature has begun to appear and is destined to
grow rapidly."); see also id. at 18 n.17 (citing recent work in the labor law
history field, including Atleson's book). According to Tomlins and King, the rise
of a new history of labor law was influenced by
first, the renewal in the 1980s of interest in institutions on the part of
historians reacting to the limitations of a purely sociocultural approach
to labor history; second, the critiques of determinism, functionalism,
and positivism in the social sciences and the accompanying rediscovery
of ideology, discourse, and hermeneutics; and third, in the law schools,
the crucial stimulus given legal history and the critical investigation of
legal phenomena by the Critical Legal Studies movement.
Id. at 3 (footnotes omitted).
34. Joel Rogers, Divide and Conquer: Further "Reflections on the Distinctive
Character of American Labor Laws," 1990 Wis. L. REV. 1, 4 n.9; see also Michael
H. Gottesman, Whither Goest Labor Law: Law and Economics in the Workplace,
100 YALE L.J. 2767, 2767 n.3 (1991) (reviewing PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE
WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAw (1990)) (including
Atleson's book in a listing of "books and articles [that] are some among the
many that are important in the field").
35. A Lexis search of law journals in January 2007 produced 189 citations.
When this data was added to the results of searches of J-STOR and Hein
Online, the total was over 200 citations or reviews of the book since its
publication in 1983. Summarizing the 189 citations found in the January 2007
Lexis search by five-year increments, produces the following data: 1983-1888:
38 citations; 1989-1994: 64 citations; 1995-2000: 51 citations; 2001-2007: 36
citations (on file with authors).
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over two hundred and fifty entries.36 Nine law journal
articles cite Values and Assumptions in the first footnote;
twenty-seven cite the book in the first five footnotes; and in
more than one-third of the law journals that cite his book,
the citation appears in the first twenty footnotes. 37
Citations to the book appeared-and continue to appear-in
a wide spectrum of law journals, wherever labor scholars
publish, from law reviews at small private law schools and
land grant universities, to major law reviews at elite
private and public law schools, 38 and to specialty journals
like the Berkeley Journal of Employment and Labor Law3 9
and the Michigan Journal of Law Reform, as well as in
books on labor law and labor history.40
Who cited Jim's book, however, is far more revealing
than where or how often it was cited. The book was cited by
scholars writing in labor law, labor history, legal history,
labor economics, comparative labor law, and discrimination
law. He influenced the writing and thinking of labor
practitioners 41 and at least one federal judge. 42 After Values
36. The 2008 Westlaw query-"Atleson /3 Values"-in the database "TP-
ALL" produced 255 results; a search for "Atleson /2 Values" in the Westlaw
"JLR" database of legal journals on January 22, 2009, produced a listing of
nearly 250 citations to the book (on file with authors).
37. Based on the 2007 Lexis search of legal journals, between 1983 and
2007, Atleson's book was also cited forty-three times within the first ten
footnotes, fifty-five times within the first fifteen footnotes, and sixty-six times
within the first twenty footnotes (on file with authors).
38. For example, the law reviews represented include the major law reviews
at Harvard, Yale, Columbia, Stanford, Georgetown, Michigan, Texas, and
Virginia, among others.
39. Between 1986 and 2005, Atleson's book was cited over twenty times in
the Berkeley Journal of Employment and Labor Law (including its predecessor
in name, the Industrial Relations Law Journal).
40. Readily accessible citation counts in electronic databases of course do
not include citations that appear in books. Citations to Atleson's book in
monographs are too numerous to compile, but see, for example, ELLEN DANNIN,
TAKING BACK THE WORKERS' LAw 173 n.27 (2006); WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND
THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 165 n.158 (Harvard Univ.
Press 1991) (1989); and ROBERT J. STEINFELD, THE INVENTION OF FREE LABOR:
THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION IN ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LAw AND CULTURE, 1350-
1870, at 200 n.1, 243 n.31 (1991).
41. See, e.g., Virginia A. Seitz, The Value of Values and Assumptions to a
Practicing Lawyer, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 687 (2009).
42. See Harry T. Edwards, The Kenneth M. Piper Lecture, Judicial Review
of Labor Arbitration Awards: The Clash Between the Public Policy Exception
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and Assumptions appeared, it seemed that no one could
ever again write about Mackay, in particular, as well as
many of the other major cases he analyzed in the book,
without acknowledging the significance of his work. 43
Scholars of all persuasions immediately grasped the
book's import,44 and the race was on to characterize or
pigeonhole its true place in labor law scholarship. Jim was
variously labeled as a Critical Legal Studies scholar,45 a
and the Duty to Bargain, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 5 n.9 (1988).
43. For Mackay, see, for example, William R. Corbett, A Proposal for
Procedural Limitations on Hiring Permanent Striker Replacements: 'A Far, Far
Better Thing" Than the Workplace Fairness Act, 72 N.C. L. REv. 813, 838 (1994);
Ross E. Davies, Strike Season: Protecting Labor-Management Conflict in the Age
of Terror, 93 GEO. L.J. 1783, 1827 n.221 (2005); Seth D. Harris, Coase's Paradox
and the Inefficiency of Permanent Strike Replacements, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 1185,
1196 n.46 (2002); Eileen Silverstein, Collective Action, Property Rights and Law
Reform: The Story of the Labor Injunction, 11 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 97, 119-20
(1993); Paul Weiler, Striking a New Balance: Freedom of Contract and the
Prospects for Union Representation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 351, 388 & n.120 (1984);
Charles E. Wilson, The Replacement of Lawful Economic Strikers in the Public
Sector in Ohio, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 639, 644 & n.45, 649 & n.80, 651 & nn.94, 96
(1985); Deborah C. Malamud, Of Voice, Charisma, and the Bottom Line, 88 GEO.
L.J. 691, 709-10, 710 n.102 (2000) (reviewing JuLIus GETMAN, THE BETRAYAL OF
LOCAL 14: PAPERWORKERS, POLITICS, AND PERMANENT REPLACEMENTS (1998)). For
Fansteel, see, for example, Craig Becker, "Better Than a Strike'" Protecting New
Forms of Collective Work Stoppages Under the National Labor Relations Act, 61
U. CHI. L. REV. 351, 365 n.60 (1994); Cynthia L. Estlund, Labor, Property, and
Sovereignty After Lechmere, 46 STAN. L. REV. 305, 311 n.36 (1994). For
Darlington Mills, see, for example, Cynthia L. Estlund, Economic Rationality
and Union Avoidance: Misunderstanding the National Labor Relations Act, 71
TEX. L. REV. 921, 937 nn.51 & 53 (1993); Ken Matheny & Marion Crain, Disloyal
Workers and the '"n-American" Labor Law, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1705, 1724 n.124
(2004). For Jefferson Standard, see, for example, Cynthia L. Estlund, What Do
Workers Want? Employee Interests, Public Interests, and Freedom of Expression
Under the National Labor Relations Act, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 921, 930 n.40, 963
n. 178 (1992); Alan Story, Employer Speech, Union Representation Elections, and
the First Amendment, 16 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 356, 404 n.255 (1995).
44. For example, in 1984, both Alan Hyde on the left and Charles Fried on
the right cited the book. See Charles Fried, Individual and Collective Rights in
Work Relations: Reflections on the Current State of Labor Law and Its Prospects,
51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1012, 1012 n.1 (1984); Alan Hyde, Democracy in Collective
Bargaining, 93 YALE L.J. 793, 829 n.124 (1984).
45. See, e.g, Cohen, supra note 16, at 169 n.1; Richard Michael Fischl, Some
Realism About Critical Legal Studies, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 505, 528 n.74 (1987);
Neil Fox, PATCO and the Courts: Public Sector Labor Law as Ideology, 1985 U.
ILL. L. REV. 245, 255; Gregory, supra note 18, at 389, 399; Minda, supra note 27,
at 485-86; Rabban, supra note 19, at 1120; Theodore J. St. Antoine, Legal
Barriers to Worker Participation in Management Decision Making, 58 TUL. L.
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leftist, 46 a Marxist,47 a radical,48 a democratic socialist,49
and a legal realist.50 Moreover, scholars that identified
themselves with the Critical Legal Studies movement cited
his book and claimed him as one of their own. 51 His work
was often cited alongside two influential Critical Legal
Studies scholars of labor law, Karl Klare and Katherine
Van Wezel Stone, 52 who began publishing in the field
shortly before the appearance of Jim's book.53 For better or
worse, the three were often linked together as the critical
labor law triumvirate.
Jim's oral history interview offers some revealing and
instructive insights about his reaction to the attempt to
REV. 1301, 1319 & n.81 (1984); Book Note, supra note 20, at 845.
46. See, e.g., Fried, supra note 44, at 1012; Gregory, supra note 18, at 400-
01; David L. Gregory, Book Review, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 680, 684 n.20, 688 &
n.46, 689 n.55 (1985).
47. See, e.g., Gregory, supra note 18, at 401.
48. See, e.g., Ernst, Taking Stock, supra note 16, at 482; Fried, supra note
44, at 1012; Gregory, supra note 46, at 684 n.20.
49. See, e.g., Rabban, supra note 19, at 1121.
50. See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, A Theory of Minimum Contract Terms, With
Implications for Labor Law, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1741, 1757 & n.63 (1996).
51. See, e.g., Kennedy & Kare, supra note 31, at 461, 465; Karl E. Kare,
Traditional Labor Law Scholarship and the Crisis of Collective Bargaining
Law: A Reply to Professor Finkin, 44 MD. L. REV. 731, 735 & nn.13-14 (1985);
Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Re-Envisioning Labor Law: A Response to
Professor Finkin, 45 MD. L. REV. 978, 979 n.8 (1986).
52. See, e.g., MELVYN DUBOFSKY, THE STATE AND LABOR IN MODERN AMERICA
241 n.17, 270 n.45, 274 n.8 (1994); CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER: How
WORKPLACE BONDS STRENGTHEN A DIVERSE DEMOCRACY 208 n.24 (2003); JOSEPH
E. SLATER, PUBLIC WORKERS: GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE UNIONS, THE LAW, AND THE
STATE, 1900-1962, at 238 n.10 (2004); ANTHONY WOODIWISS, RIGHTS V.
CONSPIRACY: A SOCIOLOGICAL ESSAY ON THE HISTORY OF LABOUR LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES 5 (1990); Cynthia Estlund, Reflections on the Declining Prestige
of American Labor Law Scholarship, 23 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 789, 797 n.37
(2002); Alan Hyde, Employment Law After the Death of Employment, 1 U. PA. J.
LAB. & EMP. L. 99, 102 n.8 (1998); Tomlins & King, supra note 32, at 17 n.12;
Craig Becker, Individual Rights and Collective Action: The Legal History of
Trade Unions in America, 100 HARv. L. REV. 672, 673 (1987) (reviewing
CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS: LABOR RELATIONS LAW
AND THE ORGANIZED LABOR MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1880-1960 (1985)); Cohen,
supra note 16, at 181-83.
53. See Karl E. Kare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the
Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1978);
Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Post-War Paradigm in American Labor Law,
90 YALE L.J. 1509 (1981).
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brand him:
Konefsky: [L]et me ask you a question about your reaction to the
reaction to the book. I remember there were a couple of times you
said to me out of frustration, "Well, they think this book is
emblematic of Critical Legal Studies." You said, "I wrote this book
way before Critical Legal Studies was even born."
Atleson: Yes. There was often a footnote referring to publications
by Critical Legal Studies people-Karl Klare, Katherine Stone,
and James Atleson. And I would say, "No. This isn't Critical Legal
Studies." I mean, Critical Legal Studies helped in lots of ways, but
I kind of knew where I was going before there ever was a CLS. I
wasn't perturbed to be a member of that great group, but
historically it was wrong. But, that was very common to see this as
some kind of radical book,[54] which I never thought it really was. I
think there were a number of people who missed what the book
was about. It was actually a critique of legal writing. 55
Authors are not necessarily the most perceptive critics
of where their contributions might stand in the literature of
a field, particularly an emerging field. But Jim is adamant
that he was not a "crit." Though it is certainly possible that
one can write unselfconsciously either in anticipation of, or
participation in, a movement, even if it is as amorphous or
broadly defined as Critical Legal Studies, Jim chafes at the
charge of radicalism. He may be right. The book appears in
some ways derived from Beardian Progressivism 56 or
progressive historiography. The ideology that Jim uses to
frame the legal cases in Values and Assumptions emerges
from competing views about material interests and
economic conflict in the marketplace. He asserted: "In the
world of labor relations, power and economic realities are
often as, or even more, relevant and informative than legal
rules. ' 57 In Jim's view, the invisible hand seems to be social
54. Ironically, in 1998, after citing works by several critical labor law
scholars, including Atleson's book, Alan Hyde commented, "It is amazing that
this work was ever seen as radical." Hyde, supra note 52, at 102 n.8. This just
goes to show that you can't please everyone all the time.
55. Atleson Interview, supra note 5, at 39-40.
56. See generally RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE PROGRESSIVE HISTORIANS:
TURNER, BEARD, PARRINGTON (1968). In this regard, the methodology of
Atleson's book is reminiscent of MORTON J. HORwiTZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977).
57. ATLESON, supra note 1, at 31.
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class. He was writing about legal doctrine and ideology as
episodes in the history of ideas, but the ideas were clearly
tied to and grew out of underlying social and economic
attitudes. And, characteristically for Jim, he wanted his
students to understand the backdrop of those values and
assumptions because he had a very practical reason-it
would make them more successful practicing lawyers, make
them understand better the world they were about to enter,
and perhaps, therefore, have an impact on the larger world
of labor law. In the end, his most striking contribution to
his students and to the labor law world was insisting that
the available and acceptable ideas in the field were broader
than usually constructed, and that, in the end, wherever
they came from, ideas mattered. Theory informed practice.
We believe that this symposium demonstrates that a
quarter century later, Jim's book still makes people think.

